f3s: Kubernetes with FreeBSD - Part 6: Storage
Published at 2025-07-13T16:44:29+03:00
This is the sixth blog post about the f3s series for self-hosting demands in a home lab. f3s? The "f" stands for FreeBSD, and the "3s" stands for k3s, the Kubernetes distribution used on FreeBSD-based physical machines.
2024-11-17 f3s: Kubernetes with FreeBSD - Part 1: Setting the stage
2024-12-03 f3s: Kubernetes with FreeBSD - Part 2: Hardware and base installation
2025-02-01 f3s: Kubernetes with FreeBSD - Part 3: Protecting from power cuts
2025-04-05 f3s: Kubernetes with FreeBSD - Part 4: Rocky Linux Bhyve VMs
2025-05-11 f3s: Kubernetes with FreeBSD - Part 5: WireGuard mesh network
2025-07-14 f3s: Kubernetes with FreeBSD - Part 6: Storage (You are currently reading this)
Table of Contents
Introduction
In the previous posts, we set up a FreeBSD-based Kubernetes cluster using k3s. While the base system works well, Kubernetes workloads often require persistent storage for databases, configuration files, and application data. Local storage on each node has significant limitations:
- No data sharing: Pods (once we run Kubernetes) on different nodes can't access the same data
- Pod mobility: If a pod moves to another node, it loses access to its data
- No redundancy: Hardware failure means data loss
This post implements a robust storage solution using:
- CARP: For high availability with automatic IP failover
- NFS over stunnel: For secure, encrypted network storage
- ZFS: For data integrity, encryption, and efficient snapshots
- zrepl: For continuous ZFS replication between nodes
The result is a highly available, encrypted storage system that survives node failures while providing shared storage to all Kubernetes pods.
Other than what was mentioned in the first post of this blog series, we aren't using HAST, but zrepl for data replication. Read more about it later in this blog post.
Additional storage capacity
We add 1 TB of additional storage to each of the nodes (f0, f1, f2) in the form of an SSD drive. The Beelink mini PCs have enough space in the chassis for the extra space.
Upgrading the storage was as easy as unscrewing, plugging the drive in, and then screwing it back together again. The procedure was uneventful! We're using two different SSD models (Samsung 870 EVO and Crucial BX500) to avoid simultaneous failures from the same manufacturing batch.
We then create the zdata ZFS pool on all three nodes:
paul@f0:~ % doas zpool create -m /data zdata /dev/ada1
paul@f0:~ % zpool list
NAME SIZE ALLOC FREE CKPOINT EXPANDSZ FRAG CAP DEDUP HEALTH ALTROOT
zdata 928G 12.1M 928G - - 0% 0% 1.00x ONLINE -
zroot 472G 29.0G 443G - - 0% 6% 1.00x ONLINE -
paul@f0:/ % doas camcontrol devlist
<512GB SSD D910R170> at scbus0 target 0 lun 0 (pass0,ada0)
<Samsung SSD 870 EVO 1TB SVT03B6Q> at scbus1 target 0 lun 0 (pass1,ada1)
paul@f0:/ %
To verify that we have a different SSD on the second node (the third node has the same drive as the first):
paul@f1:/ % doas camcontrol devlist
<512GB SSD D910R170> at scbus0 target 0 lun 0 (pass0,ada0)
<CT1000BX500SSD1 M6CR072> at scbus1 target 0 lun 0 (pass1,ada1)
ZFS encryption keys
ZFS native encryption requires encryption keys to unlock datasets. We need a secure method to store these keys that balances security with operational needs:
- Security: Keys must not be stored on the same disks they encrypt
- Availability: Keys must be available at boot for automatic mounting
- Portability: Keys should be easily moved between systems for recovery
Using USB flash drives as hardware key storage provides a convenient and elegant solution. The encrypted data is unreadable without physical access to the USB key, protecting against disk theft or improper disposal. In production environments, you may use enterprise key management systems; however, for a home lab, USB keys offer good security with minimal complexity.
UFS on USB keys
We'll format the USB drives with UFS (Unix File System) rather than ZFS for simplicity. There is no need to use ZFS.
Let's see the USB keys:
To verify that the USB key (flash disk) is there:
paul@f0:/ % doas camcontrol devlist
<512GB SSD D910R170> at scbus0 target 0 lun 0 (pass0,ada0)
<Samsung SSD 870 EVO 1TB SVT03B6Q> at scbus1 target 0 lun 0 (pass1,ada1)
<Generic Flash Disk 8.07> at scbus2 target 0 lun 0 (da0,pass2)
paul@f0:/ %
Let's create the UFS file system and mount it (done on all three nodes f0, f1 and f2):
paul@f0:/ % doas newfs /dev/da0
/dev/da0: 15000.0MB (30720000 sectors) block size 32768, fragment size 4096
using 24 cylinder groups of 625.22MB, 20007 blks, 80128 inodes.
with soft updates
super-block backups (for fsck_ffs -b #) at:
192, 1280640, 2561088, 3841536, 5121984, 6402432, 7682880, 8963328, 10243776,
11524224, 12804672, 14085120, 15365568, 16646016, 17926464, 19206912,k 20487360,
...
paul@f0:/ % echo '/dev/da0 /keys ufs rw 0 2' | doas tee -a /etc/fstab
/dev/da0 /keys ufs rw 0 2
paul@f0:/ % doas mkdir /keys
paul@f0:/ % doas mount /keys
paul@f0:/ % df | grep keys
/dev/da0 14877596 8 13687384 0% /keys
Generating encryption keys
The following keys will later be used to encrypt the ZFS file systems. They will be stored on all three nodes, serving as a backup in case one of the keys is lost or corrupted. When we later replicate encrypted ZFS volumes from one node to another, the keys must also be available on the destination node.
paul@f0:/keys % doas openssl rand -out /keys/f0.lan.buetow.org:bhyve.key 32
paul@f0:/keys % doas openssl rand -out /keys/f1.lan.buetow.org:bhyve.key 32
paul@f0:/keys % doas openssl rand -out /keys/f2.lan.buetow.org:bhyve.key 32
paul@f0:/keys % doas openssl rand -out /keys/f0.lan.buetow.org:zdata.key 32
paul@f0:/keys % doas openssl rand -out /keys/f1.lan.buetow.org:zdata.key 32
paul@f0:/keys % doas openssl rand -out /keys/f2.lan.buetow.org:zdata.key 32
paul@f0:/keys % doas chown root *
paul@f0:/keys % doas chmod 400 *
paul@f0:/keys % ls -l
total 20
*r-------- 1 root wheel 32 May 25 13:07 f0.lan.buetow.org:bhyve.key
*r-------- 1 root wheel 32 May 25 13:07 f1.lan.buetow.org:bhyve.key
*r-------- 1 root wheel 32 May 25 13:07 f2.lan.buetow.org:bhyve.key
*r-------- 1 root wheel 32 May 25 13:07 f0.lan.buetow.org:zdata.key
*r-------- 1 root wheel 32 May 25 13:07 f1.lan.buetow.org:zdata.key
*r-------- 1 root wheel 32 May 25 13:07 f2.lan.buetow.org:zdata.key
After creation, these are copied to the other two nodes, f1 and f2, into the /keys partition (I won't provide the commands here; create a tarball, copy it over, and extract it on the destination nodes).
Configuring zdata ZFS pool encryption
Let's encrypt our zdata ZFS pool. We are not encrypting the whole pool, but everything within the zdata/enc data set:
paul@f0:/keys % doas zfs create -o encryption=on -o keyformat=raw -o \
keylocation=file:///keys/`hostname`:zdata.key zdata/enc
paul@f0:/ % zfs list | grep zdata
zdata 836K 899G 96K /data
zdata/enc 200K 899G 200K /data/enc
paul@f0:/keys % zfs get all zdata/enc | grep -E -i '(encryption|key)'
zdata/enc encryption aes-256-gcm -
zdata/enc keylocation file:///keys/f0.lan.buetow.org:zdata.key local
zdata/enc keyformat raw -
zdata/enc encryptionroot zdata/enc -
zdata/enc keystatus available -
All future data sets within zdata/enc will inherit the same encryption key.
Migrating Bhyve VMs to an encrypted bhyve ZFS volume
We set up Bhyve VMs in a previous blog post. Their ZFS data sets rely on zroot, which is the default ZFS pool on the internal 512GB NVME drive. They aren't encrypted yet, so we encrypt the VM data sets as well now. To do so, we first shut down the VMs on all three nodes:
paul@f0:/keys % doas vm stop rocky
Sending ACPI shutdown to rocky
paul@f0:/keys % doas vm list
NAME DATASTORE LOADER CPU MEMORY VNC AUTO STATE
rocky default uefi 4 14G - Yes [1] Stopped
After this, we rename the unencrypted data set to _old, create a new encrypted data set, and also snapshot it as @hamburger.
paul@f0:/keys % doas zfs rename zroot/bhyve zroot/bhyve_old
paul@f0:/keys % doas zfs set mountpoint=/mnt zroot/bhyve_old
paul@f0:/keys % doas zfs snapshot zroot/bhyve_old/rocky@hamburger
paul@f0:/keys % doas zfs create -o encryption=on -o keyformat=raw -o \
keylocation=file:///keys/`hostname`:bhyve.key zroot/bhyve
paul@f0:/keys % doas zfs set mountpoint=/zroot/bhyve zroot/bhyve
paul@f0:/keys % doas zfs set mountpoint=/zroot/bhyve/rocky zroot/bhyve/rocky
Once done, we import the snapshot into the encrypted dataset and also copy some other metadata files from vm-bhyve back over.
paul@f0:/keys % doas zfs send zroot/bhyve_old/rocky@hamburger | \
doas zfs recv zroot/bhyve/rocky
paul@f0:/keys % doas cp -Rp /mnt/.config /zroot/bhyve/
paul@f0:/keys % doas cp -Rp /mnt/.img /zroot/bhyve/
paul@f0:/keys % doas cp -Rp /mnt/.templates /zroot/bhyve/
paul@f0:/keys % doas cp -Rp /mnt/.iso /zroot/bhyve/
We also have to make encrypted ZFS data sets mount automatically on boot:
paul@f0:/keys % doas sysrc zfskeys_enable=YES
zfskeys_enable: -> YES
paul@f0:/keys % doas vm init
paul@f0:/keys % doas reboot
.
.
.
paul@f0:~ % doas vm list
paul@f0:~ % doas vm list
NAME DATASTORE LOADER CPU MEMORY VNC AUTO STATE
rocky default uefi 4 14G 0.0.0.0:5900 Yes [1] Running (2265)
As you can see, the VM is running. This means the encrypted zroot/bhyve was mounted successfully after the reboot! Now we can destroy the old, unencrypted, and now unused bhyve dataset:
paul@f0:~ % doas zfs destroy -R zroot/bhyve_old
To verify once again that zroot/bhyve and zroot/bhyve/rocky are now both encrypted, we run:
paul@f0:~ % zfs get all zroot/bhyve | grep -E '(encryption|key)'
zroot/bhyve encryption aes-256-gcm -
zroot/bhyve keylocation file:///keys/f0.lan.buetow.org:bhyve.key local
zroot/bhyve keyformat raw -
zroot/bhyve encryptionroot zroot/bhyve -
zroot/bhyve keystatus available -
paul@f0:~ % zfs get all zroot/bhyve/rocky | grep -E '(encryption|key)'
zroot/bhyve/rocky encryption aes-256-gcm -
zroot/bhyve/rocky keylocation none default
zroot/bhyve/rocky keyformat raw -
zroot/bhyve/rocky encryptionroot zroot/bhyve -
zroot/bhyve/rocky keystatus available -
ZFS Replication with zrepl
Data replication is the cornerstone of high availability. While CARP handles IP failover (see later in this post), we need continuous data replication to ensure the backup server has current data when it becomes active. Without replication, failover would result in data loss or require shared storage (like iSCSI), which introduces a single point of failure.
Understanding Replication Requirements
Our storage system has different replication needs:
- NFS data (/data/nfs/k3svolumes): Soon, it will contain active Kubernetes persistent volumes. Needs frequent replication (every minute) to minimise data loss during failover.
- VM data (/zroot/bhyve/fedora): Contains VM images that change less frequently. Can tolerate longer replication intervals (every 10 minutes).
The 1-minute replication window is perfectly acceptable for my personal use cases. This isn't a high-frequency trading system or a real-time database—it's storage for personal projects, development work, and home lab experiments. Losing at most 1 minute of work in a disaster scenario is a reasonable trade-off for the reliability and simplicity of snapshot-based replication. Additionally, in the case of a "1 minute of data loss," I would likely still have the data available on the client side.
Why use zrepl instead of HAST? While HAST (Highly Available Storage) is FreeBSD's native solution for high-availability storage and supports synchronous replication—thus eliminating the mentioned 1-minute window—I've chosen zrepl for several important reasons:
- HAST can cause ZFS corruption: HAST operates at the block level and doesn't understand ZFS's transactional semantics. During failover, in-flight transactions can lead to corrupted zpools. I've experienced this firsthand (I am confident I have configured something wrong) - the automatic failover would trigger while ZFS was still writing, resulting in an unmountable pool.
- ZFS-aware replication: zrepl understands ZFS datasets and snapshots. It replicates at the dataset level, ensuring each snapshot is a consistent point-in-time copy. This is fundamentally safer than block-level replication.
- Snapshot history: With zrepl, you get multiple recovery points (every minute for NFS data in our setup). If corruption occurs, you can roll back to any previous snapshot. HAST only gives you the current state.
- Easier recovery: When something goes wrong with zrepl, you still have intact snapshots on both sides. With HAST, a corrupted primary often means a corrupted secondary as well.
FreeBSD HAST
Installing zrepl
First, install zrepl on both hosts involved (we will replicate data from f0 to f1):
paul@f0:~ % doas pkg install -y zrepl
Then, we verify the pools and datasets on both hosts:
# On f0
paul@f0:~ % doas zpool list
NAME SIZE ALLOC FREE CKPOINT EXPANDSZ FRAG CAP DEDUP HEALTH ALTROOT
zdata 928G 1.03M 928G - - 0% 0% 1.00x ONLINE -
zroot 472G 26.7G 445G - - 0% 5% 1.00x ONLINE -
paul@f0:~ % doas zfs list -r zdata/enc
NAME USED AVAIL REFER MOUNTPOINT
zdata/enc 200K 899G 200K /data/enc
# On f1
paul@f1:~ % doas zpool list
NAME SIZE ALLOC FREE CKPOINT EXPANDSZ FRAG CAP DEDUP HEALTH ALTROOT
zdata 928G 956K 928G - - 0% 0% 1.00x ONLINE -
zroot 472G 11.7G 460G - - 0% 2% 1.00x ONLINE -
paul@f1:~ % doas zfs list -r zdata/enc
NAME USED AVAIL REFER MOUNTPOINT
zdata/enc 200K 899G 200K /data/enc
Since we have a WireGuard tunnel between f0 and f1, we'll use TCP transport over the secure tunnel instead of SSH. First, check the WireGuard IP addresses:
# Check WireGuard interface IPs
paul@f0:~ % ifconfig wg0 | grep inet
inet 192.168.2.130 netmask 0xffffff00
paul@f1:~ % ifconfig wg0 | grep inet
inet 192.168.2.131 netmask 0xffffff00
Let's create a dedicated dataset for NFS data that will be replicated:
# Create the nfsdata dataset that will hold all data exposed via NFS
paul@f0:~ % doas zfs create zdata/enc/nfsdata
Afterwards, we create the zrepl configuration on f0:
paul@f0:~ % doas tee /usr/local/etc/zrepl/zrepl.yml <<'EOF'
global:
logging:
- type: stdout
level: info
format: human
jobs:
- name: f0_to_f1_nfsdata
type: push
connect:
type: tcp
address: "192.168.2.131:8888"
filesystems:
"zdata/enc/nfsdata": true
send:
encrypted: true
snapshotting:
type: periodic
prefix: zrepl_
interval: 1m
pruning:
keep_sender:
- type: last_n
count: 10
keep_receiver:
- type: last_n
count: 10
- name: f0_to_f1_fedora
type: push
connect:
type: tcp
address: "192.168.2.131:8888"
filesystems:
"zroot/bhyve/fedora": true
send:
encrypted: true
snapshotting:
type: periodic
prefix: zrepl_
interval: 10m
pruning:
keep_sender:
- type: last_n
count: 10
keep_receiver:
- type: last_n
count: 10
EOF
We're using two separate replication jobs with different intervals:
- f0_to_f1_nfsdata: Replicates NFS data every minute for faster failover recovery
- f0_to_f1_fedora: Replicates Fedora VM every ten minutes (less critical)
The Fedora VM is only used for development purposes, so it doesn't require as frequent replication as the NFS data. It's off-topic to this blog series, but it showcases, hows zrepl's flexibility in handling different datasets with varying replication needs.
Furthermore:
- We're specifically replicating zdata/enc/nfsdata instead of the entire zdata/enc dataset. This dedicated dataset will contain all the data we later want to expose via NFS, keeping a clear separation between replicated NFS data and other local encrypted data.
- The send: encrypted: false option turns off ZFS native encryption for the replication stream. Since we're using a WireGuard tunnel between f0 and f1, the data is already encrypted in transit. Disabling ZFS stream encryption reduces CPU overhead and improves replication performance.
Configuring zrepl on f1 (sink)
On f1 (the sink, meaning it's the node receiving the replication data), we configure zrepl to receive the data as follows:
# First, create a dedicated sink dataset
paul@f1:~ % doas zfs create zdata/sink
paul@f1:~ % doas tee /usr/local/etc/zrepl/zrepl.yml <<'EOF'
global:
logging:
- type: stdout
level: info
format: human
jobs:
- name: sink
type: sink
serve:
type: tcp
listen: "192.168.2.131:8888"
clients:
"192.168.2.130": "f0"
recv:
placeholder:
encryption: inherit
root_fs: "zdata/sink"
EOF
Enabling and starting zrepl services
We then enable and start zrepl on both hosts via:
# On f0
paul@f0:~ % doas sysrc zrepl_enable=YES
zrepl_enable: -> YES
paul@f0:~ % doas service `zrepl` start
Starting zrepl.
# On f1
paul@f1:~ % doas sysrc zrepl_enable=YES
zrepl_enable: -> YES
paul@f1:~ % doas service `zrepl` start
Starting zrepl.
To check the replication status, we run:
# On f0, check `zrepl` status (use raw mode for non-tty)
paul@f0:~ % doas pkg install jq
paul@f0:~ % doas zrepl status --mode raw | grep -A2 "Replication" | jq .
"Replication":{"StartAt":"2025-07-01T22:31:48.712143123+03:00"...
# Check if services are running
paul@f0:~ % doas service zrepl status
zrepl is running as pid 2649.
paul@f1:~ % doas service zrepl status
zrepl is running as pid 2574.
# Check for `zrepl` snapshots on source
paul@f0:~ % doas zfs list -t snapshot -r zdata/enc | grep zrepl
zdata/enc@zrepl_20250701_193148_000 0B - 176K -
# On f1, verify the replicated datasets
paul@f1:~ % doas zfs list -r zdata | grep f0
zdata/f0 576K 899G 200K none
zdata/f0/zdata 376K 899G 200K none
zdata/f0/zdata/enc 176K 899G 176K none
# Check replicated snapshots on f1
paul@f1:~ % doas zfs list -t snapshot -r zdata | grep zrepl
zdata/f0/zdata/enc@zrepl_20250701_193148_000 0B - 176K -
zdata/f0/zdata/enc@zrepl_20250701_194148_000 0B - 176K -
.
.
.
Monitoring replication
You can monitor the replication progress with:
paul@f0:~ % doas zrepl status
With this setup, both zdata/enc/nfsdata and zroot/bhyve/fedora on f0 will be automatically replicated to f1 every 1 minute (or 10 minutes in the case of the Fedora VM), with encrypted snapshots preserved on both sides. The pruning policy ensures that we keep the last 10 snapshots while managing disk space efficiently.
The replicated data appears on f1 under zdata/sink/ with the source host and dataset hierarchy preserved:
- zdata/enc/nfsdata → zdata/sink/f0/zdata/enc/nfsdata
- zroot/bhyve/fedora → zdata/sink/f0/zroot/bhyve/fedora
This is by design - zrepl preserves the complete path from the source to ensure there are no conflicts when replicating from multiple sources.
Verifying replication after reboot
The zrepl service is configured to start automatically at boot. After rebooting both hosts:
paul@f0:~ % uptime
11:17PM up 1 min, 0 users, load averages: 0.16, 0.06, 0.02
paul@f0:~ % doas service `zrepl` status
zrepl is running as pid 2366.
paul@f1:~ % doas service `zrepl` status
zrepl is running as pid 2309.
# Check that new snapshots are being created and replicated
paul@f0:~ % doas zfs list -t snapshot | grep `zrepl` | tail -2
zdata/enc/nfsdata@zrepl_20250701_202530_000 0B - 200K -
zroot/bhyve/fedora@zrepl_20250701_202530_000 0B - 2.97G -
.
.
.
paul@f1:~ % doas zfs list -t snapshot -r zdata/sink | grep 202530
zdata/sink/f0/zdata/enc/nfsdata@zrepl_20250701_202530_000 0B - 176K -
zdata/sink/f0/zroot/bhyve/fedora@zrepl_20250701_202530_000 0B - 2.97G -
.
.
.
The timestamps confirm that replication resumed automatically after the reboot, ensuring continuous data protection. We can also write a test file to the NFS data directory on f0 and verify whether it appears on f1 after a minute.
Understanding Failover Limitations and Design Decisions
Our system intentionally fails over to a read-only copy of the replica in the event of the primary's failure. This is due to the nature of zrepl, which only replicates data in one direction. If we mount the data set on the sink node in read-write mode, it would cause the ZFS dataset to diverge from the original, and the replication would break. It can still be mounted read-write on the sink node in case of a genuine issue on the primary node, but that step is left intentionally manual. Therefore, we don't need to fix the replication later on manually.
So in summary:
- Split-brain prevention: Automatic failover to a read-write copy can cause both nodes to become active simultaneously if network communication fails. This leads to data divergence that's extremely difficult to resolve.
- False positive protection: Temporary network issues or high load can trigger unwanted failovers. Manual intervention ensures that failovers occur only when truly necessary.
- Data integrity over availability: For storage systems, data consistency is paramount. A few minutes of downtime is preferable to data corruption in this specific use case.
- Simplified recovery: With manual failover, you always know which dataset is authoritative, making recovery more straightforward.
Mounting the NFS datasets
To make the NFS data accessible on both nodes, we need to mount it. On f0, this is straightforward:
# On f0 - set mountpoint for the primary nfsdata
paul@f0:~ % doas zfs set mountpoint=/data/nfs zdata/enc/nfsdata
paul@f0:~ % doas mkdir -p /data/nfs
# Verify it's mounted
paul@f0:~ % df -h /data/nfs
Filesystem Size Used Avail Capacity Mounted on
zdata/enc/nfsdata 899G 204K 899G 0% /data/nfs
On f1, we need to handle the encryption key and mount the standby copy:
# On f1 - first check encryption status
paul@f1:~ % doas zfs get keystatus zdata/sink/f0/zdata/enc/nfsdata
NAME PROPERTY VALUE SOURCE
zdata/sink/f0/zdata/enc/nfsdata keystatus unavailable -
# Load the encryption key (using f0's key stored on the USB)
paul@f1:~ % doas zfs load-key -L file:///keys/f0.lan.buetow.org:zdata.key \
zdata/sink/f0/zdata/enc/nfsdata
# Set mountpoint and mount (same path as f0 for easier failover)
paul@f1:~ % doas mkdir -p /data/nfs
paul@f1:~ % doas zfs set mountpoint=/data/nfs zdata/sink/f0/zdata/enc/nfsdata
paul@f1:~ % doas zfs mount zdata/sink/f0/zdata/enc/nfsdata
# Make it read-only to prevent accidental writes that would break replication
paul@f1:~ % doas zfs set readonly=on zdata/sink/f0/zdata/enc/nfsdata
# Verify
paul@f1:~ % df -h /data/nfs
Filesystem Size Used Avail Capacity Mounted on
zdata/sink/f0/zdata/enc/nfsdata 896G 204K 896G 0% /data/nfs
Note: The dataset is mounted at the same path (/data/nfs) on both hosts to simplify failover procedures. The dataset on f1 is set to readonly=on to prevent accidental modifications, which, as mentioned earlier, would break replication. If we did, replication from f0 to f1 would fail like this:
cannot receive incremental stream: destination zdata/sink/f0/zdata/enc/nfsdata has been modified since most recent snapshot
To fix a broken replication after accidental writes, we can do:
# Option 1: Rollback to the last common snapshot (loses local changes)
paul@f1:~ % doas zfs rollback zdata/sink/f0/zdata/enc/nfsdata@zrepl_20250701_204054_000
# Option 2: Make it read-only to prevent accidents again
paul@f1:~ % doas zfs set readonly=on zdata/sink/f0/zdata/enc/nfsdata
And replication should work again!
Troubleshooting: Files not appearing in replication
If you write files to /data/nfs/ on f0 but they don't appear on f1, check if the dataset is mounted on f0?
paul@f0:~ % doas zfs list -o name,mountpoint,mounted | grep nfsdata
zdata/enc/nfsdata /data/nfs yes
If it shows no, the dataset isn't mounted! This means files are being written to the root filesystem, not ZFS. Next, we should check whether the encryption key is loaded:
paul@f0:~ % doas zfs get keystatus zdata/enc/nfsdata
NAME PROPERTY VALUE SOURCE
zdata/enc/nfsdata keystatus available -
# If "unavailable", load the key:
paul@f0:~ % doas zfs load-key -L file:///keys/f0.lan.buetow.org:zdata.key zdata/enc/nfsdata
paul@f0:~ % doas zfs mount zdata/enc/nfsdata
You can also verify that files are in the snapshot (not just the directory):
paul@f0:~ % ls -la /data/nfs/.zfs/snapshot/zrepl_*/
This issue commonly occurs after a reboot if the encryption keys aren't configured to load automatically.
Configuring automatic key loading on boot
To ensure all additional encrypted datasets are mounted automatically after reboot as well, we do:
# On f0 - configure all encrypted datasets
paul@f0:~ % doas sysrc zfskeys_enable=YES
zfskeys_enable: YES -> YES
paul@f0:~ % doas sysrc zfskeys_datasets="zdata/enc zdata/enc/nfsdata zroot/bhyve"
zfskeys_datasets: -> zdata/enc zdata/enc/nfsdata zroot/bhyve
# Set correct key locations for all datasets
paul@f0:~ % doas zfs set \
keylocation=file:///keys/f0.lan.buetow.org:zdata.key zdata/enc/nfsdata
# On f1 - include the replicated dataset
paul@f1:~ % doas sysrc zfskeys_enable=YES
zfskeys_enable: YES -> YES
paul@f1:~ % doas sysrc \
zfskeys_datasets="zdata/enc zroot/bhyve zdata/sink/f0/zdata/enc/nfsdata"
zfskeys_datasets: -> zdata/enc zroot/bhyve zdata/sink/f0/zdata/enc/nfsdata
# Set key location for replicated dataset
paul@f1:~ % doas zfs set \
keylocation=file:///keys/f0.lan.buetow.org:zdata.key zdata/sink/f0/zdata/enc/nfsdata
Important notes:
- Each encryption root needs its own key load entry
- The replicated dataset on f1 uses the same encryption key as the source on f0
- Always verify datasets are mounted after reboot with zfs list -o name,mounted
- Critical: Always ensure the replicated dataset on f1 remains read-only with doas zfs set readonly=on zdata/sink/f0/zdata/enc/nfsdata
CARP (Common Address Redundancy Protocol)
High availability is crucial for storage systems. If the storage server goes down, all NFS clients (which will also be Kubernetes pods later on in this series) lose access to their persistent data. CARP provides a solution by creating a virtual IP address that automatically migrates to a different server during failures. This means that clients point to that VIP for NFS mounts and are always contacting the current primary node.
How CARP Works
In our case, CARP allows two hosts (f0 and f1) to share a virtual IP address (VIP). The hosts communicate using multicast to elect a MASTER, while the other remain as BACKUP. When the MASTER fails, the BACKUP automatically promotes itself, and the VIP is reassigned to the new MASTER. This happens within seconds.
Key benefits for our storage system:
- Automatic failover: No manual intervention is required for basic failures, although there are a few limitations. The backup will have read-only access to the available data by default, as we have already learned.
- Transparent to clients: Pods continue using the same IP address
- Works with stunnel: Behind the VIP, there will be a stunnel process running, which ensures encrypted connections follow the active server.
FreeBSD CARP
Stunnel
Configuring CARP
First, we add the CARP configuration to /etc/rc.conf on both f0 and f1:
# The virtual IP 192.168.1.138 will float between f0 and f1
ifconfig_re0_alias0="inet vhid 1 pass testpass alias 192.168.1.138/32"
Whereas:
- vhid 1: Virtual Host ID - must match on all CARP members
- pass testpass: Password for CARP authentication (if you follow this, use a different password!)
- alias 192.168.1.138/32: The virtual IP address with a /32 netmask
Next, update /etc/hosts on all nodes (f0, f1, f2, r0, r1, r2) to resolve the VIP hostname:
192.168.1.138 f3s-storage-ha f3s-storage-ha.lan f3s-storage-ha.lan.buetow.org
This allows clients to connect to f3s-storage-ha regardless of which physical server is currently the MASTER.
CARP State Change Notifications
To correctly manage services during failover, we need to detect CARP state changes. FreeBSD's devd system can notify us when CARP transitions between MASTER and BACKUP states.
Add this to /etc/devd.conf on both f0 and f1:
paul@f0:~ % cat <<END | doas tee -a /etc/devd.conf
notify 0 {
match "system" "CARP";
match "subsystem" "[0-9]+@[0-9a-z.]+";
match "type" "(MASTER|BACKUP)";
action "/usr/local/bin/carpcontrol.sh $subsystem $type";
};
END
paul@f0:~ % doas service devd restart
Next, we create the CARP control script that will restart stunnel when the CARP state changes:
paul@f0:~ % doas tee /usr/local/bin/carpcontrol.sh <<'EOF'
#!/bin/sh
# CARP state change control script
case "$1" in
MASTER)
logger "CARP state changed to MASTER, starting services"
;;
BACKUP)
logger "CARP state changed to BACKUP, stopping services"
;;
*)
logger "CARP state changed to $1 (unhandled)"
;;
esac
EOF
paul@f0:~ % doas chmod +x /usr/local/bin/carpcontrol.sh
# Copy the same script to f1
paul@f0:~ % scp /usr/local/bin/carpcontrol.sh f1:/tmp/
paul@f1:~ % doas mv /tmp/carpcontrol.sh /usr/local/bin/
paul@f1:~ % doas chmod +x /usr/local/bin/carpcontrol.sh
Note that carpcontrol.sh doesn't do anything useful yet. We will provide more details (including starting and stopping services upon failover) later in this blog post.
To enable CARP in /boot/loader.conf, run:
paul@f0:~ % echo 'carp_load="YES"' | doas tee -a /boot/loader.conf
carp_load="YES"
paul@f1:~ % echo 'carp_load="YES"' | doas tee -a /boot/loader.conf
carp_load="YES"
Then reboot both hosts or run doas kldload carp to load the module immediately.
NFS Server Configuration
With ZFS replication in place, we can now set up NFS servers on both f0 and f1 to export the replicated data. Since native NFS over TLS (RFC 9289) has compatibility issues between Linux and FreeBSD (not digging into the details here, but I couldn't get it to work), we'll use stunnel to provide encryption.
Setting up NFS on f0 (Primary)
First, enable the NFS services in rc.conf:
paul@f0:~ % doas sysrc nfs_server_enable=YES
nfs_server_enable: YES -> YES
paul@f0:~ % doas sysrc nfsv4_server_enable=YES
nfsv4_server_enable: YES -> YES
paul@f0:~ % doas sysrc nfsuserd_enable=YES
nfsuserd_enable: YES -> YES
paul@f0:~ % doas sysrc mountd_enable=YES
mountd_enable: NO -> YES
paul@f0:~ % doas sysrc rpcbind_enable=YES
rpcbind_enable: NO -> YES
And we also create a dedicated directory for Kubernetes volumes:
# First, ensure the dataset is mounted
paul@f0:~ % doas zfs get mounted zdata/enc/nfsdata
NAME PROPERTY VALUE SOURCE
zdata/enc/nfsdata mounted yes -
# Create the k3svolumes directory
paul@f0:~ % doas mkdir -p /data/nfs/k3svolumes
paul@f0:~ % doas chmod 755 /data/nfs/k3svolumes
We also create the /etc/exports file. Since we're using stunnel for encryption, ALL clients must connect through stunnel, which appears as localhost (127.0.0.1) to the NFS server:
paul@f0:~ % doas tee /etc/exports <<'EOF'
V4: /data/nfs -sec=sys
/data/nfs -alldirs -maproot=root -network 127.0.0.1 -mask 255.255.255.255
EOF
The exports configuration:
- V4: /data/nfs -sec=sys: Sets the NFSv4 root directory to /data/nfs
- -maproot=root: Maps root user from client to root on server
- -network 127.0.0.1: Only accepts connections from localhost (stunnel)
To start the NFS services, we run:
paul@f0:~ % doas service rpcbind start
Starting rpcbind.
paul@f0:~ % doas service mountd start
Starting mountd.
paul@f0:~ % doas service nfsd start
Starting nfsd.
paul@f0:~ % doas service nfsuserd start
Starting nfsuserd.
Configuring Stunnel for NFS Encryption with CARP Failover
Using stunnel with client certificate authentication for NFS encryption provides several advantages:
- Compatibility: Works with any NFS version and between different operating systems
- Strong encryption: Uses TLS/SSL with configurable cipher suites
- Transparent: Applications don't need modification, encryption happens at the transport layer
- Performance: Minimal overhead (~2% in benchmarks)
- Flexibility: Can encrypt any TCP-based protocol, not just NFS
- Strong Authentication: Client certificates provide cryptographic proof of identity
- Access Control: Only clients with valid certificates signed by your CA can connect
- Certificate Revocation: You can revoke access by removing certificates from the CA
Stunnel integrates seamlessly with our CARP setup:
CARP VIP (192.168.1.138)
|
f0 (MASTER) ←---------→|←---------→ f1 (BACKUP)
stunnel:2323 | stunnel:stopped
nfsd:2049 | nfsd:stopped
|
Clients connect here
The key insight is that stunnel binds to the CARP VIP. When CARP fails over, the VIP is moved to the new master, and stunnel starts there automatically. Clients maintain their connection to the same IP throughout.
Creating a Certificate Authority for Client Authentication
First, create a CA to sign both server and client certificates:
# On f0 - Create CA
paul@f0:~ % doas mkdir -p /usr/local/etc/stunnel/ca
paul@f0:~ % cd /usr/local/etc/stunnel/ca
paul@f0:~ % doas openssl genrsa -out ca-key.pem 4096
paul@f0:~ % doas openssl req -new -x509 -days 3650 -key ca-key.pem -out ca-cert.pem \
-subj '/C=US/ST=State/L=City/O=F3S Storage/CN=F3S Stunnel CA'
# Create server certificate
paul@f0:~ % cd /usr/local/etc/stunnel
paul@f0:~ % doas openssl genrsa -out server-key.pem 4096
paul@f0:~ % doas openssl req -new -key server-key.pem -out server.csr \
-subj '/C=US/ST=State/L=City/O=F3S Storage/CN=f3s-storage-ha.lan'
paul@f0:~ % doas openssl x509 -req -days 3650 -in server.csr -CA ca/ca-cert.pem \
-CAkey ca/ca-key.pem -CAcreateserial -out server-cert.pem
# Create client certificates for authorised clients
paul@f0:~ % cd /usr/local/etc/stunnel/ca
paul@f0:~ % doas sh -c 'for client in r0 r1 r2 earth; do
openssl genrsa -out ${client}-key.pem 4096
openssl req -new -key ${client}-key.pem -out ${client}.csr \
-subj "/C=US/ST=State/L=City/O=F3S Storage/CN=${client}.lan.buetow.org"
openssl x509 -req -days 3650 -in ${client}.csr -CA ca-cert.pem \
-CAkey ca-key.pem -CAcreateserial -out ${client}-cert.pem
done'
# Install stunnel
paul@f0:~ % doas pkg install -y stunnel
# Configure stunnel server with client certificate authentication
paul@f0:~ % doas tee /usr/local/etc/stunnel/stunnel.conf <<'EOF'
cert = /usr/local/etc/stunnel/server-cert.pem
key = /usr/local/etc/stunnel/server-key.pem
setuid = stunnel
setgid = stunnel
[nfs-tls]
accept = 192.168.1.138:2323
connect = 127.0.0.1:2049
CAfile = /usr/local/etc/stunnel/ca/ca-cert.pem
verify = 2
requireCert = yes
EOF
# Enable and start stunnel
paul@f0:~ % doas sysrc stunnel_enable=YES
stunnel_enable: -> YES
paul@f0:~ % doas service stunnel start
Starting stunnel.
# Restart stunnel to apply the CARP VIP binding
paul@f0:~ % doas service stunnel restart
Stopping stunnel.
Starting stunnel.
The configuration includes:
- verify = 2: Verify client certificate and fail if not provided
- requireCert = yes: Client must present a valid certificate
- CAfile: Path to the CA certificate that signed the client certificates
Setting up NFS on f1 (Standby)
Repeat the same configuration on f1:
paul@f1:~ % doas sysrc nfs_server_enable=YES
nfs_server_enable: NO -> YES
paul@f1:~ % doas sysrc nfsv4_server_enable=YES
nfsv4_server_enable: NO -> YES
paul@f1:~ % doas sysrc nfsuserd_enable=YES
nfsuserd_enable: NO -> YES
paul@f1:~ % doas sysrc mountd_enable=YES
mountd_enable: NO -> YES
paul@f1:~ % doas sysrc rpcbind_enable=YES
rpcbind_enable: NO -> YES
paul@f1:~ % doas tee /etc/exports <<'EOF'
V4: /data/nfs -sec=sys
/data/nfs -alldirs -maproot=root -network 127.0.0.1 -mask 255.255.255.255
EOF
paul@f1:~ % doas service rpcbind start
Starting rpcbind.
paul@f1:~ % doas service mountd start
Starting mountd.
paul@f1:~ % doas service nfsd start
Starting nfsd.
paul@f1:~ % doas service nfsuserd start
Starting nfsuserd.
And to configure stunnel on f1, we run:
# Install stunnel
paul@f1:~ % doas pkg install -y stunnel
# Copy certificates from f0
paul@f0:~ % doas tar -cf /tmp/stunnel-certs.tar \
-C /usr/local/etc/stunnel server-cert.pem server-key.pem ca
paul@f0:~ % scp /tmp/stunnel-certs.tar f1:/tmp/
paul@f1:~ % cd /usr/local/etc/stunnel && doas tar -xf /tmp/stunnel-certs.tar
# Configure stunnel server on f1 with client certificate authentication
paul@f1:~ % doas tee /usr/local/etc/stunnel/stunnel.conf <<'EOF'
cert = /usr/local/etc/stunnel/server-cert.pem
key = /usr/local/etc/stunnel/server-key.pem
setuid = stunnel
setgid = stunnel
[nfs-tls]
accept = 192.168.1.138:2323
connect = 127.0.0.1:2049
CAfile = /usr/local/etc/stunnel/ca/ca-cert.pem
verify = 2
requireCert = yes
EOF
# Enable and start stunnel
paul@f1:~ % doas sysrc stunnel_enable=YES
stunnel_enable: -> YES
paul@f1:~ % doas service stunnel start
Starting stunnel.
# Restart stunnel to apply the CARP VIP binding
paul@f1:~ % doas service stunnel restart
Stopping stunnel.
Starting stunnel.
CARP Control Script for Clean Failover
With stunnel configured to bind to the CARP VIP (192.168.1.138), only the server that is currently the CARP MASTER will accept stunnel connections. This provides automatic failover for encrypted NFS:
- When f0 is CARP MASTER: stunnel on f0 accepts connections on 192.168.1.138:2323
- When f1 becomes CARP MASTER: stunnel on f1 starts accepting connections on 192.168.1.138:2323
- The backup server's stunnel process will fail to bind to the VIP and won't accept connections
This ensures that clients always connect to the active NFS server through the CARP VIP. To ensure clean failover behaviour and prevent stale file handles, we'll update our carpcontrol.sh script so that:
- Stops NFS services on BACKUP nodes (preventing split-brain scenarios)
- Starts NFS services only on the MASTER node
- Manages stunnel binding to the CARP VIP
This approach ensures clients can only connect to the active server, eliminating stale handles from the inactive server:
# Create CARP control script on both f0 and f1
paul@f0:~ % doas tee /usr/local/bin/carpcontrol.sh <<'EOF'
#!/bin/sh
# CARP state change control script
case "$1" in
MASTER)
logger "CARP state changed to MASTER, starting services"
service rpcbind start >/dev/null 2>&1
service mountd start >/dev/null 2>&1
service nfsd start >/dev/null 2>&1
service nfsuserd start >/dev/null 2>&1
service stunnel restart >/dev/null 2>&1
logger "CARP MASTER: NFS and stunnel services started"
;;
BACKUP)
logger "CARP state changed to BACKUP, stopping services"
service stunnel stop >/dev/null 2>&1
service nfsd stop >/dev/null 2>&1
service mountd stop >/dev/null 2>&1
service nfsuserd stop >/dev/null 2>&1
logger "CARP BACKUP: NFS and stunnel services stopped"
;;
*)
logger "CARP state changed to $1 (unhandled)"
;;
esac
EOF
paul@f0:~ % doas chmod +x /usr/local/bin/carpcontrol.sh
CARP Management Script
To simplify CARP state management and failover testing, create this helper script on both f0 and f1:
# Create the CARP management script
paul@f0:~ % doas tee /usr/local/bin/carp <<'EOF'
#!/bin/sh
# CARP state management script
# Usage: carp [master|backup|auto-failback enable|auto-failback disable]
# Without arguments: shows current state
# Find the interface with CARP configured
CARP_IF=$(ifconfig -l | xargs -n1 | while read if; do
ifconfig "$if" 2>/dev/null | grep -q "carp:" && echo "$if" && break
done)
if [ -z "$CARP_IF" ]; then
echo "Error: No CARP interface found"
exit 1
fi
# Get CARP VHID
VHID=$(ifconfig "$CARP_IF" | grep "carp:" | sed -n 's/.*vhid \([0-9]*\).*/\1/p')
if [ -z "$VHID" ]; then
echo "Error: Could not determine CARP VHID"
exit 1
fi
# Function to get the current state
get_state() {
ifconfig "$CARP_IF" | grep "carp:" | awk '{print $2}'
}
# Check for auto-failback block file
BLOCK_FILE="/data/nfs/nfs.NO_AUTO_FAILBACK"
check_auto_failback() {
if [ -f "$BLOCK_FILE" ]; then
echo "WARNING: Auto-failback is DISABLED (file exists: $BLOCK_FILE)"
fi
}
# Main logic
case "$1" in
"")
# No argument - show current state
STATE=$(get_state)
echo "CARP state on $CARP_IF (vhid $VHID): $STATE"
check_auto_failback
;;
master)
# Force to MASTER state
echo "Setting CARP to MASTER state..."
ifconfig "$CARP_IF" vhid "$VHID" state master
sleep 1
STATE=$(get_state)
echo "CARP state on $CARP_IF (vhid $VHID): $STATE"
check_auto_failback
;;
backup)
# Force to BACKUP state
echo "Setting CARP to BACKUP state..."
ifconfig "$CARP_IF" vhid "$VHID" state backup
sleep 1
STATE=$(get_state)
echo "CARP state on $CARP_IF (vhid $VHID): $STATE"
check_auto_failback
;;
auto-failback)
case "$2" in
enable)
if [ -f "$BLOCK_FILE" ]; then
rm "$BLOCK_FILE"
echo "Auto-failback ENABLED (removed $BLOCK_FILE)"
else
echo "Auto-failback was already enabled"
fi
;;
disable)
if [ ! -f "$BLOCK_FILE" ]; then
touch "$BLOCK_FILE"
echo "Auto-failback DISABLED (created $BLOCK_FILE)"
else
echo "Auto-failback was already disabled"
fi
;;
*)
echo "Usage: $0 auto-failback [enable|disable]"
echo " enable: Remove block file to allow automatic failback"
echo " disable: Create block file to prevent automatic failback"
exit 1
;;
esac
;;
*)
echo "Usage: $0 [master|backup|auto-failback enable|auto-failback disable]"
echo " Without arguments: show current CARP state"
echo " master: force this node to become CARP MASTER"
echo " backup: force this node to become CARP BACKUP"
echo " auto-failback enable: allow automatic failback to f0"
echo " auto-failback disable: prevent automatic failback to f0"
exit 1
;;
esac
EOF
paul@f0:~ % doas chmod +x /usr/local/bin/carp
# Copy to f1 as well
paul@f0:~ % scp /usr/local/bin/carp f1:/tmp/
paul@f1:~ % doas cp /tmp/carp /usr/local/bin/carp && doas chmod +x /usr/local/bin/carp
Now you can easily manage CARP states and auto-failback:
# Check current CARP state
paul@f0:~ % doas carp
CARP state on re0 (vhid 1): MASTER
# If auto-failback is disabled, you'll see a warning
paul@f0:~ % doas carp
CARP state on re0 (vhid 1): MASTER
WARNING: Auto-failback is DISABLED (file exists: /data/nfs/nfs.NO_AUTO_FAILBACK)
# Force f0 to become BACKUP (triggers failover to f1)
paul@f0:~ % doas carp backup
Setting CARP to BACKUP state...
CARP state on re0 (vhid 1): BACKUP
# Disable auto-failback (useful for maintenance)
paul@f0:~ % doas carp auto-failback disable
Auto-failback DISABLED (created /data/nfs/nfs.NO_AUTO_FAILBACK)
# Enable auto-failback
paul@f0:~ % doas carp auto-failback enable
Auto-failback ENABLED (removed /data/nfs/nfs.NO_AUTO_FAILBACK)
Automatic Failback After Reboot
When f0 reboots (planned or unplanned), f1 takes over as CARP MASTER. To ensure f0 automatically reclaims its primary role once it's fully operational, we'll implement an automatic failback mechanism. With:
paul@f0:~ % doas tee /usr/local/bin/carp-auto-failback.sh <<'EOF'
#!/bin/sh
# CARP automatic failback script for f0
# Ensures f0 reclaims MASTER role after reboot when storage is ready
LOGFILE="/var/log/carp-auto-failback.log"
MARKER_FILE="/data/nfs/nfs.DO_NOT_REMOVE"
BLOCK_FILE="/data/nfs/nfs.NO_AUTO_FAILBACK"
log_message() {
echo "$(date '+%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S') - $1" >> "$LOGFILE"
}
# Check if we're already MASTER
CURRENT_STATE=$(/usr/local/bin/carp | awk '{print $NF}')
if [ "$CURRENT_STATE" = "MASTER" ]; then
exit 0
fi
# Check if /data/nfs is mounted
if ! mount | grep -q "on /data/nfs "; then
log_message "SKIP: /data/nfs not mounted"
exit 0
fi
# Check if the marker file exists
# (identifies that the ZFS data set is properly mounted)
if [ ! -f "$MARKER_FILE" ]; then
log_message "SKIP: Marker file $MARKER_FILE not found"
exit 0
fi
# Check if failback is blocked (for maintenance)
if [ -f "$BLOCK_FILE" ]; then
log_message "SKIP: Failback blocked by $BLOCK_FILE"
exit 0
fi
# Check if NFS services are running (ensure we're fully ready)
if ! service nfsd status >/dev/null 2>&1; then
log_message "SKIP: NFS services not yet running"
exit 0
fi
# All conditions met - promote to MASTER
log_message "CONDITIONS MET: Promoting to MASTER (was $CURRENT_STATE)"
/usr/local/bin/carp master
# Log result
sleep 2
NEW_STATE=$(/usr/local/bin/carp | awk '{print $NF}')
log_message "Failback complete: State is now $NEW_STATE"
# If successful, log to the system log too
if [ "$NEW_STATE" = "MASTER" ]; then
logger "CARP: f0 automatically reclaimed MASTER role"
fi
EOF
paul@f0:~ % doas chmod +x /usr/local/bin/carp-auto-failback.sh
The marker file identifies that the ZFS data set is mounted correctly. We create it with:
paul@f0:~ % doas touch /data/nfs/nfs.DO_NOT_REMOVE
We add a cron job to check every minute:
paul@f0:~ % echo "* * * * * /usr/local/bin/carp-auto-failback.sh" | doas crontab -
The enhanced CARP script provides integrated control over auto-failback. To temporarily turn off automatic failback (e.g., for f0 maintenance), we run:
paul@f0:~ % doas carp auto-failback disable
Auto-failback DISABLED (created /data/nfs/nfs.NO_AUTO_FAILBACK)
And to re-enable it:
paul@f0:~ % doas carp auto-failback enable
Auto-failback ENABLED (removed /data/nfs/nfs.NO_AUTO_FAILBACK)
To check whether auto-failback is enabled, we run:
paul@f0:~ % doas carp
CARP state on re0 (vhid 1): MASTER
# If disabled, you'll see: WARNING: Auto-failback is DISABLED
The failback attempts are logged to /var/log/carp-auto-failback.log!
So, in summary:
- After f0 reboots: f1 is MASTER, f0 boots as BACKUP
- Cron runs every minute: Checks if conditions are met (Is f0 currently BACKUP? (don't run if already MASTER)), (Is /data/nfs mounted? (ZFS datasets are ready)), (Does marker file exist? (confirms this is primary storage)), (Is failback blocked? (admin can prevent failback)), (Are NFS services running? (system is fully ready))
- Failback occurs: Typically 2-3 minutes after boot completes
- Logging: All attempts logged for troubleshooting
This ensures f0 automatically resumes its role as primary storage server after any reboot, while providing administrative control when needed.
Client Configuration for NFS via Stunnel
To mount NFS shares with stunnel encryption, clients must install and configure stunnel using their client certificates.
Configuring Rocky Linux Clients (r0, r1, r2)
On the Rocky Linux VMs, we run:
# Install stunnel on client (example for `r0`)
[root@r0 ~]# dnf install -y stunnel nfs-utils
# Copy client certificate and CA certificate from f0
[root@r0 ~]# scp f0:/usr/local/etc/stunnel/ca/r0-key.pem /etc/stunnel/
[root@r0 ~]# scp f0:/usr/local/etc/stunnel/ca/ca-cert.pem /etc/stunnel/
# Configure stunnel client with certificate authentication
[root@r0 ~]# tee /etc/stunnel/stunnel.conf <<'EOF'
cert = /etc/stunnel/r0-key.pem
CAfile = /etc/stunnel/ca-cert.pem
client = yes
verify = 2
[nfs-ha]
accept = 127.0.0.1:2323
connect = 192.168.1.138:2323
EOF
# Enable and start stunnel
[root@r0 ~]# systemctl enable --now stunnel
# Repeat for r1 and r2 with their respective certificates
Note: Each client must use its certificate file (r0-key.pem, r1-key.pem, r2-key.pem, or earth-key.pem - the latter is for my Laptop, which can also mount the NFS shares).
Testing NFS Mount with Stunnel
To mount NFS through the stunnel encrypted tunnel, we run:
# Create a mount point
[root@r0 ~]# mkdir -p /data/nfs/k3svolumes
# Mount through stunnel (using localhost and NFSv4)
[root@r0 ~]# mount -t nfs4 -o port=2323 127.0.0.1:/data/nfs/k3svolumes /data/nfs/k3svolumes
# Verify mount
[root@r0 ~]# mount | grep k3svolumes
127.0.0.1:/data/nfs/k3svolumes on /data/nfs/k3svolumes
type nfs4 (rw,relatime,vers=4.2,rsize=131072,wsize=131072,
namlen=255,hard,proto=tcp,port=2323,timeo=600,retrans=2,sec=sys,
clientaddr=127.0.0.1,local_lock=none,addr=127.0.0.1)
# For persistent mount, add to /etc/fstab:
127.0.0.1:/data/nfs/k3svolumes /data/nfs/k3svolumes nfs4 port=2323,_netdev 0 0
Note: The mount uses localhost (127.0.0.1) because stunnel is listening locally and forwarding the encrypted traffic to the remote server.
Testing CARP Failover with mounted clients and stale file handles:
To test the failover process:
# On f0 (current MASTER) - trigger failover
paul@f0:~ % doas ifconfig re0 vhid 1 state backup
# On f1 - verify it becomes MASTER
paul@f1:~ % ifconfig re0 | grep carp
inet 192.168.1.138 netmask 0xffffffff broadcast 192.168.1.138 vhid 1
# Check stunnel is now listening on f1
paul@f1:~ % doas sockstat -l | grep 2323
stunnel stunnel 4567 3 tcp4 192.168.1.138:2323 *:*
# On client - verify NFS mount still works
[root@r0 ~]# ls /data/nfs/k3svolumes/
[root@r0 ~]# echo "Test after failover" > /data/nfs/k3svolumes/failover-test.txt
After a CARP failover, NFS clients may experience "Stale file handle" errors because they cached file handles from the previous server. To resolve this manually, we can run:
# Force unmount and remount
[root@r0 ~]# umount -f /data/nfs/k3svolumes
[root@r0 ~]# mount /data/nfs/k3svolumes
For the automatic recovery, we create a script:
[root@r0 ~]# cat > /usr/local/bin/check-nfs-mount.sh << 'EOF'
#!/bin/bash
# Fast NFS mount health monitor - runs every 10 seconds via systemd timer
MOUNT_POINT="/data/nfs/k3svolumes"
LOCK_FILE="/var/run/nfs-mount-check.lock"
STATE_FILE="/var/run/nfs-mount.state"
# Use a lock file to prevent concurrent runs
if [ -f "$LOCK_FILE" ]; then
exit 0
fi
touch "$LOCK_FILE"
trap "rm -f $LOCK_FILE" EXIT
# Quick check - try to stat a directory with a very short timeout
if timeout 2s stat "$MOUNT_POINT" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
# Mount appears healthy
if [ -f "$STATE_FILE" ]; then
# Was previously unhealthy, log recovery
echo "NFS mount recovered at $(date)" | systemd-cat -t nfs-monitor -p info
rm -f "$STATE_FILE"
fi
exit 0
fi
# Mount is unhealthy
if [ ! -f "$STATE_FILE" ]; then
# First detection of unhealthy state
echo "NFS mount unhealthy detected at $(date)" | systemd-cat -t nfs-monitor -p warning
touch "$STATE_FILE"
fi
# Try to fix
echo "Attempting to fix stale NFS mount at $(date)" | systemd-cat -t nfs-monitor -p notice
umount -f "$MOUNT_POINT" 2>/dev/null
sleep 1
if mount "$MOUNT_POINT"; then
echo "NFS mount fixed at $(date)" | systemd-cat -t nfs-monitor -p info
rm -f "$STATE_FILE"
else
echo "Failed to fix NFS mount at $(date)" | systemd-cat -t nfs-monitor -p err
fi
EOF
[root@r0 ~]# chmod +x /usr/local/bin/check-nfs-mount.sh
And we create the systemd service as follows:
[root@r0 ~]# cat > /etc/systemd/system/nfs-mount-monitor.service << 'EOF'
[Unit]
Description=NFS Mount Health Monitor
After=network-online.target
[Service]
Type=oneshot
ExecStart=/usr/local/bin/check-nfs-mount.sh
StandardOutput=journal
StandardError=journal
EOF
And we also create the systemd timer (runs every 10 seconds):
[root@r0 ~]# cat > /etc/systemd/system/nfs-mount-monitor.timer << 'EOF'
[Unit]
Description=Run NFS Mount Health Monitor every 10 seconds
Requires=nfs-mount-monitor.service
[Timer]
OnBootSec=30s
OnUnitActiveSec=10s
AccuracySec=1s
[Install]
WantedBy=timers.target
EOF
To enable and start the timer, we run:
[root@r0 ~]# systemctl daemon-reload
[root@r0 ~]# systemctl enable nfs-mount-monitor.timer
[root@r0 ~]# systemctl start nfs-mount-monitor.timer
# Check status
[root@r0 ~]# systemctl status nfs-mount-monitor.timer
● nfs-mount-monitor.timer - Run NFS Mount Health Monitor every 10 seconds
Loaded: loaded (/etc/systemd/system/nfs-mount-monitor.timer; enabled)
Active: active (waiting) since Sat 2025-07-06 10:00:00 EEST
Trigger: Sat 2025-07-06 10:00:10 EEST; 8s left
# Monitor logs
[root@r0 ~]# journalctl -u nfs-mount-monitor -f
Note: Stale file handles are inherent to NFS failover because file handles are server-specific. The best approach depends on your application's tolerance for brief disruptions. Of course, all the changes made to r0 above must also be applied to r1 and r2.
Complete Failover Test
Here's a comprehensive test of the failover behaviour with all optimisations in place:
# 1. Check the initial state
paul@f0:~ % ifconfig re0 | grep carp
carp: MASTER vhid 1 advbase 1 advskew 0
paul@f1:~ % ifconfig re0 | grep carp
carp: BACKUP vhid 1 advbase 1 advskew 0
# 2. Create a test file from a client
[root@r0 ~]# echo "test before failover" > /data/nfs/k3svolumes/test-before.txt
# 3. Trigger failover (f0 → f1)
paul@f0:~ % doas ifconfig re0 vhid 1 state backup
# 4. Monitor client behaviour
[root@r0 ~]# ls /data/nfs/k3svolumes/
ls: cannot access '/data/nfs/k3svolumes/': Stale file handle
# 5. Check automatic recovery (within 10 seconds)
[root@r0 ~]# journalctl -u nfs-mount-monitor -f
Jul 06 10:15:32 r0 nfs-monitor[1234]: NFS mount unhealthy detected at \
Sun Jul 6 10:15:32 EEST 2025
Jul 06 10:15:32 r0 nfs-monitor[1234]: Attempting to fix stale NFS mount at \
Sun Jul 6 10:15:32 EEST 2025
Jul 06 10:15:33 r0 nfs-monitor[1234]: NFS mount fixed at \
Sun Jul 6 10:15:33 EEST 2025
Failover Timeline:
- 0 seconds: CARP failover triggered
- 0-2 seconds: Clients get "Stale file handle" errors (not hanging)
- 3-10 seconds: Soft mounts ensure quick failure of operations
- Within 10 seconds: Automatic recovery via systemd timer
Benefits of the Optimised Setup:
- No hanging processes - Soft mounts fail quickly
- Clean failover - Old server stops serving immediately
- Fast automatic recovery - No manual intervention needed
- Predictable timing - Recovery within 10 seconds with systemd timer
- Better visibility - systemd journal provides detailed logs
Important Considerations:
- Recent writes (within 1 minute) may not be visible after failover due to replication lag
- Applications should handle brief NFS errors gracefully
- For zero-downtime requirements, consider synchronous replication or distributed storage (see "Future storage explorations" section later in this blog post)
Conclusion
We've built a robust, encrypted storage system for our FreeBSD-based Kubernetes cluster that provides:
- High Availability: CARP ensures the storage VIP moves automatically during failures
- Data Protection: ZFS encryption protects data at rest, stunnel protects data in transit
- Continuous Replication: 1-minute RPO for the data, automated via zrepl
- Secure Access: Client certificate authentication prevents unauthorised access
Some key lessons learned are:
- Stunnel vs Native NFS/TLS: While native encryption would be ideal, stunnel provides better cross-platform compatibility
- Manual vs Automatic Failover: For storage systems, controlled failover often prevents more problems than it causes
- Client Compatibility: Different NFS implementations behave differently - test thoroughly
Future Storage Explorations
While zrepl provides excellent snapshot-based replication for disaster recovery, there are other storage technologies worth exploring for the f3s project:
MinIO for S3-Compatible Object Storage
MinIO is a high-performance, S3-compatible object storage system that could complement our ZFS-based storage. Some potential use cases:
- S3 API compatibility: Many modern applications expect S3-style object storage APIs. MinIO could provide this interface while using our ZFS storage as the backend.
- Multi-site replication: MinIO supports active-active replication across multiple sites, which could work well with our f0/f1/f2 node setup.
- Kubernetes native: MinIO has excellent Kubernetes integration with operators and CSI drivers, making it ideal for the f3s k3s environment.
MooseFS for Distributed High Availability
MooseFS is a fault-tolerant, distributed file system that could provide proper high-availability storage:
- True HA: Unlike our current setup, which requires manual failover, MooseFS provides automatic failover with no single point of failure.
- POSIX compliance: Applications can use MooseFS like any regular filesystem, no code changes needed.
- Flexible redundancy: Configure different replication levels per directory or file, optimising storage efficiency.
- FreeBSD support: MooseFS has native FreeBSD support, making it a natural fit for the f3s project.
Both technologies could run on top of our encrypted ZFS volumes, combining ZFS's data integrity and encryption features with distributed storage capabilities. This would be particularly interesting for workloads that need either S3-compatible APIs (MinIO) or transparent distributed POSIX storage (MooseFS). What about Ceph and GlusterFS? Unfortunately, there doesn't seem to be great native FreeBSD support for them. However, other alternatives also appear suitable for my use case.
I'm looking forward to the next post in this series, where we will set up k3s (Kubernetes) on the Linux VMs.
Other *BSD-related posts:
2025-07-14 f3s: Kubernetes with FreeBSD - Part 6: Storage (You are currently reading this)
2025-05-11 f3s: Kubernetes with FreeBSD - Part 5: WireGuard mesh network
2025-04-05 f3s: Kubernetes with FreeBSD - Part 4: Rocky Linux Bhyve VMs
2025-02-01 f3s: Kubernetes with FreeBSD - Part 3: Protecting from power cuts
2024-12-03 f3s: Kubernetes with FreeBSD - Part 2: Hardware and base installation
2024-11-17 f3s: Kubernetes with FreeBSD - Part 1: Setting the stage
2024-04-01 KISS high-availability with OpenBSD
2024-01-13 One reason why I love OpenBSD
2022-10-30 Installing DTail on OpenBSD
2022-07-30 Let's Encrypt with OpenBSD and Rex
2016-04-09 Jails and ZFS with Puppet on FreeBSD
E-Mail your comments to paul@nospam.buetow.org
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